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Over the past decade, many cognitive control researchers have studied to what extent
adaptations to conflict are domain-general or rather specific, mostly by testing whether
or not the congruency sequence effect (CSE) transfers across different conditions (e.g.,
conflict type, task sets, contexts, et cetera). The CSE refers to the observation that
congruency effects in conflict tasks tend to be reduced following incongruent relative to
following congruent trials, and is considered a prime measure of cognitive control. By
investigating the transfer of this CSE across different conflict types, tasks, or contexts,
researchers made several inferences about the scope of cognitive control. This method
gained popularity during the last few years, spawning an interesting, yet seemingly
inconsistent set of results. Consequently, these observations gave rise to a number of
equally divergent theories about the determinants and scope of conflict adaptation. In this
review, we offer a systematic overview of these past studies, as well as an evaluation of
the theories that have been put forward to account for the results. Finally, we propose
an integration of these various theoretical views in a unifying framework that centers on
the role of context (dis)similarity. This framework allows us to generate new predictions
about the relation between task or context similarity and the scope of cognitive control.
Specifically, while most theories imply that increasing contextual differences will result in
reduced transfer of the CSE, we propose that context similarity and across-context control
follow a U-shaped function instead.
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The study of cognitive control is generally concerned with how
we adapt our information processing and action selection to con-
stantly changing task environments and goals. Central to this
research has been the study of cognitive conflict, where it is inves-
tigated how irrelevant information interferes with action selection
by evoking conflicting responses. Previous work has convincingly
demonstrated that humans (and other animals) have the ability to
flexibly and rapidly adapt to such conflicting response activations,
in order to carry out the rest of the task (or other related tasks that
follow)more efficiently. In the current reviewwe focus on the pre-
cise nature of such conflict adaptation processes by zooming in on
empirical and theoretical work on the congruency sequence effect
(CSE).
The CSE is a hypothesized marker of conflict adaptation and
has served as an important research tool for investigating the
scope of cognitive control. In the lab, the CSE is typically stud-
ied by means of a conflict task, such as the flanker, Simon, or
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; Simon and Rudell, 1967; Eriksen and
Eriksen, 1974). In the Stroop task, for example, the participants’
task is to respond to the ink color of the word, while ignor-
ing the word’s meaning. This way, congruent trials, where ink
color and word meaning evoke similar responses (e.g., the word
GREEN printed in green), and incongruent trials, where ink color
and word meaning evoke different responses (e.g., the word RED
printed in green), can be created. On incongruent trials, word
meaning is believed to interfere with the processing of the ink
color, thereby slowing down and occasionally preventing accu-
rate responses. The difference between reaction times or response
accuracies is then referred to as the congruency effect (or in this
task, the Stroop effect). Whereas the congruency effect is assumed
to reflect conflict in information processing, the CSE is typically
taken as a proxy for how people adapt their behavior in response
to this conflict. Specifically, the CSE concerns the observation that
congruency effects tend to be reduced after an incongruent as
compared to after a congruent trial. This effect was first observed
by Gratton et al. (1992), and is also known as the Gratton or
conflict adaptation effect.
A central issue in discussing the nature of conflict adapta-
tion concerns its specificity. On the one hand, it is possible that
conflict adaptation is characterized by domain-general boosts in
attention that allows us to enhance overall performance. However,
as we shall see below, empirical work has resulted in theorizing
on more specific adaptation processes. The major tool in explor-
ing such specificity then concerns the transfer of the CSE across
various conditions. For example, if one experiences a conflict in
a particular task A, to which extent will this influence the pro-
cessing of cognitive conflict in a subsequent task B? The current
paper reviews this type of transfer studies and will consist of three
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main sections. In a first part of this review, we will outline some
of the most prominent theories on cognitive control in general,
and the CSE in particular. Importantly, besides conflict adapta-
tion theories, this will also include theories that ascribe the CSE
to non-conflict based adaptation but still have something to say
about specificity of the CSE as well. Next, we will offer a brief
but comprehensive overview of the empirical work thus far that
investigated the transfer of the CSE across conditions. These two
sections serve as a state-of-the-art reference guide for future work
on the specificity of cognitive control. From there, however, we
will also re-evaluate and integrate the ongoing theories and ideas
in light of these empirical studies. We will close the review by
identifying some outstanding research questions and outline how
we can validate or falsify these new hypotheses.
THEORIES ON THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT
In this section, we summarize what we believe to be the most
important current theories on the specificity of cognitive control,
and the CSE in particular. Although these theories are obviously
not mutually exclusive, we will extract from each its core notion
(see Table 1). This overview is meant to be comprehensive, but
not exhaustive. Therefore, our description of theories will focus
on, and hence often be restricted to, the hypotheses concerning
the specificity of cognitive control, without offering the compu-
tational details. We deliberately opted to first provide a general
overview of the different theories, as this will allow the reader to
better frame and evaluate the empirical findings reviewed in the
section to follow.
The most prominent theory of the CSE is the conflict moni-
toring theory by Botvinick et al. (2001). In this theory, cognitive
conflict is proposed to be registered by the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), which monitors the environment for conflict-
ing response tendencies. This quantifiable measure of conflict
then acts as a warning signal that motivates people to increase
task focus. Although computationally specific about how conflict
detection can be modeled (i.e., by measuring the activity at the
response level), the conflict monitoring theory is underspecified
Table 1 | Brief description of theories and their view on the scope of
conflict adaptation.





Botvinick et al., 2001 Conflict monitoring Task-relevant
information
Egner, 2008 Multiple conflict-control
loops
Conflict type
Hazeltine et al., 2011 Set-level control Task structure or
task set
Verguts and Notebaert, 2009 Adaptation-by-binding Active
representations
during conflict
Hommel et al., 2004 Feature integration Active features or
event files
Schmidt, 2013 Contingency learning Contingencies
in terms of how subsequent control can be autonomously imple-
mented. In the example of the Stroop task, it predicts that ink
color detection would be facilitated following Stroop conflict.
In a flanker task, however, conflict adaptation would lead to an
enhanced processing of target (location) information, relative to
flanker (location) information. In this sense, the conflict mon-
itoring theory thus proposes that conflict leads to an enhanced
focus on the task-relevant stimulus dimension. This implies that
the CSE would be restricted to the enhancement of task-specific
processes and therefore would not transfer to alternative tasks:
The CSE will only be observed when the previous and current
task-relevant information remain the same.
Egner (2008) offered a more detailed theory on the speci-
ficity of conflict adaptation by stressing that the conflict type is
what limits the impact of conflict processing on the previous trial.
Egner’s proposal is inspired by the taxonomy of Kornblum et al.
(1990), which allows to differentiate conflict types on the basis
of their overlap between, for example, the relevant and irrelevant
stimulus dimension (e.g., Stroop task), or between the response
dimension and irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g., Simon task).
Using this taxonomy, Egner (2008) proposes the concept of mul-
tiple conflict-control loops whereby the detection of one conflict
type (e.g., Stroop conflict) will and can only lead to the enhanced
recruitment of resources in dealing with that specific type of
conflict. Therefore, this theory suggests that (dis)similarity in con-
flict type is the crucial factor determining whether the CSE will
transfer from one task to the other.
Hazeltine et al. (2011) stress the role of task structure or task
set in determining the specificity of conflict adaptation (see also
Akçay and Hazeltine, 2008). Specifically, Hazeltine and colleagues
argue that not the relevant stimulus features per se, but rather
the entire task set will influence how participants perceive the
task, and subsequently determine the scope of conflict adaptation.
According to Hazeltine and colleagues, CSEs reflect adjustments
in task representations and are highly sensitive to salient or rele-
vant task boundaries. Therefore, the degree to which participants
will perceive the tasks as (dis)similar (i.e., the subjective task
set boundaries) will determine whether or not the CSE can be
observed across tasks.
In their adaptation by binding theory, Verguts and Notebaert
(2008, 2009) offer a new computational model to explain how
adaptations to conflict occur. Although adopting the conflict
monitor for conflict detection as proposed by Botvinick et al.
(2001), Verguts and Notebaert (2008) take a different approach
when it comes to how conflict adaptation is ultimately imple-
mented. Specifically, they argue that upon conflict detection,
a Hebbian learning signal is sent throughout the brain that
strengthens all ongoing and active representations. As the CSE is
typically studied following correct trials only, active representa-
tions are usually task-relevant associations and representations—
and these are thus predominantly strengthened, leading to
increased control. This theory is consistent with the views of
Hazeltine et al. (2011) in that it similarly proposes that task
representations and their associated boundaries are strengthened
following conflict. However, this model goes one step further as
this process is indifferent to the precise nature or task-relevance
of these features, focusing rather on all active representations.
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According to the adaptation by binding theory, then, every fea-
ture that is active during conflict and coincides with the activation
of one or the other task set can codetermine to which extent a CSE
will occur on the subsequent trial.
The major reason why the adaptation by binding theory of
Verguts and Notebaert is characterized by high specificity relates
to the notion that conflict adaptation derives from associative
learning processes, rendering it intrinsically bound to the over-
all set of representations that are active during a particular event,
including both task-relevant and -irrelevant information (i.e., the
overall context).
Interestingly, a number of theories have been proposed that
understand the CSE not so much as a cognitive control phe-
nomenon (i.e., it does not entail conflict-based adaptation), but
rather as a direct consequence of specific episodic memory pro-
cesses. First, Hommel and colleagues propose that CSEs reflect
feature integration processes (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel, 2004;
Hommel et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006). That is, on each
trial all the available stimulus and response features are bound
together into a so-called event file. However, when some of the
features from the previous trial are reused in a new combination
(i.e., partial feature repetition), this will require a breakdown of
the event file that was formed on the previous trial, and this takes
time. Partial feature repetitions taking more time than full rep-
etitions or full alternations of feature sets can produce a similar
behavioral pattern as underlies the CSE. Second, Schmidt and
colleagues have argued that learning the contingencies between
specific stimulus and response features can also lead to this
behavioral pattern as especially congruency repetitions are bene-
fiting from such contingency learning processes (Schmidt and De
Houwer, 2011). It requires no detailed elaboration that both these
episodic memory accounts predict very context-specific effects
of the previous trial on the next: every active feature or relevant
contingency can co-determine whether a CSE would be observed
across conditions. Importantly, these two accounts, in contrast to
the four before-mentioned accounts, do not see congruency iden-
tity of the previous trial as an important determinant for CSEs to
occur.
TRANSFER OF THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT
In the previous section, we briefly sketched the stance that the-
ories take on the specificity of the CSE. Here, we will offer an
overview of the published empirical work that is relevant to this
issue. Complementing our approach to the section above, where
we discussed the theories without the data, we will now try to
provide a theory-neutral description of the available data. As the
scope of the CSE has been a popular topic in recent years, a
substantial number of studies has contributed to the discussion
of what determines its specificity. We will structure the discus-
sion of these studies based on which research question they tried
to tackle (see also Table 2). Specifically, we will first discuss all
studies that tested the specificity of the CSE by investigating the
potential for transfer across different types of conflict. Second, we
will discuss a small set of studies that investigated transfer across
conflict dimensions (e.g., vertical vs. horizontal Simon task). Last,
we will discuss studies that looked at the impact of specific task
parameters (i.e., response or stimuli sets) or more contextual
task-irrelevant factors, respectively.
THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT ACROSS CONFLICT TYPES
When investigating the scope of conflict adaptation, one of the
first research questions that comes to mind is whether or not one
conflict type will influence the processing of another—and indeed
most relevant studies have investigated just that. We divided these
studies into two broad categories, depending on whether or not
the different conflict types were combined in a factorial man-
ner (see Egner, 2008). In factorial designs, the two tasks share
the same relevant dimension, and the task-irrelevant features are
crossed (i.e., both conflict types are combined within each trial).
As such, stimuli can be (in)congruent to one of the two irrelevant
dimensions, or to both. The second category involves switch-
ing designs (Egner, 2008) in which each trial is (in)congruent
with respect to only one of the two irrelevant dimensions, and
either share the relevant dimension across all trials (i.e., stimulus-
switching designs) or not (i.e., task-switching designs). In all of
the abovementioned designs, it can be investigated whether con-
flict adaptation is specific to one conflict type, or transfers across
conflict types. Below, we start out with studies that employed a
factorial task-crossing design, and then review studies that used
task- or stimulus-switching designs.
In a first study, Kunde and Stöcker (2002) factorially combined
spatial and temporal Simon conflict. They asked participants
to respond by pressing either long or briefly on a left or right
key to colored stimuli that were presented left or right from
a fixation cross for either a long or short duration. As such,
both the correspondence between stimulus and response loca-
tion (i.e., spatial Simon conflict) and the correspondence between
stimulus and response duration (i.e., temporal Simon conflict)
were manipulated. The authors did not observe across-conflict
CSEs. However, a within-conflict CSE for the temporal Simon
task was also not observed. Four years later, Kunde and Wühr
(2006) and Wendt et al. (2006) also used factorial designs to
study across-conflict CSEs. Kunde and Wühr used a factorial
combination of a horizontal Simon task and a spatial prime-
target task. Specifically, a prime arrow was presented before the
onset of a target arrow and participants had to respond to the
direction of this target arrow with a left or right hand button.
The direction of prime and target arrows could either corre-
spond or not, and both stimuli were presented at either the
left or right hand side of the screen. This way, two types of
congruencies were created: a (non)correspondence between the
prime and target arrow direction, and a (non)correspondence
between the arrow and response location. As expected, Kunde
and Wühr (2006) observed a CSE within conflict type: the Simon
effect was smaller following an incongruent Simon trial, and
the priming effect was smaller following trials with an incon-
gruent prime-target pair. More interestingly, the authors also
observed a CSE across conflict types, albeit smaller than for
within conflict type. Wendt et al. (2006) used a factorial com-
bination of a Simon task and a flanker task (Experiment 2A),
or a Simon and a Stroop task (Experiment 2B). Thus, each trial
could be defined by both Simon and flanker conflict by using
a task where flanker stimuli were laterally presented, or Simon
and Stroop conflict by laterally presenting Stroop stimuli. In both
tasks—and in contrast to the study by Kunde andWühr (2006)—
they observed CSEs within conflict type, but not across conflict
type.
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Table 2 | Studies investigating the scope of cognitive control, using the congruency sequence effect (CSE).
Authors Conflict tasks Method Findings: specific or global?
CONFLICT TYPE
Akçay and Hazeltine, 2011 Simon and flanker A factorial combination of a Simon and a
flanker task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict type
Boy et al., 2010 Flanker and prime-target A factorial combination of a Simon and a
spatial prime-target task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict task
Egner et al., 2007 Color Stroop and Simon A factorial combination of a Simon and a
color Stroop task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict task
Fernandez-Duque and Knight,
2008
Number Stroop and Flanker
or color Stroop
Performance on a number Stroop task was
investigated as a function of previously
(cued) flanker or word Stroop congruency
Global. CSE was observed across conflict
tasks. Notably, the congruency identity of
the previous trial was always cued
Forster and Cho, 2014 Simon and Stroop A Simon and Stroop task with shared
response sets were presented in fixed or
mixed blocks
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict task
Freitas et al., 2007, Experiments
2 and 3
Flanker and color Stroop or
spatial Stroop
An arrow flanker task was intermixed with
either a color word Stroop task
(Experiment 2), or a spatial Stroop task
(Experiment 3)
Global. CSE was observed across conflict
tasks
Freitas and Clark, 2014,
Experiments 2 and 3
Stroop-trajectory, Spatial
Stroop, flanker, and Simon
Two different Spatial Stroop tasks were
intermixed with a flanker task (Experiment
2) and a newly developed
Stroop-trajectory task was intermixed with
a flanker and Simon task (Experiment 3)
Global and specific. CSE was observed
across conflict tasks, except across the
Simon and Stroop-trajectory task
Funes et al., 2010a Spatial Stroop and Simon A Spatial Stroop task was intermixed with
a Simon task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict tasks
Funes et al., 2010b,
Experiments 1 and 2
Spatial Stroop and Flanker or
Simon
A Spatial Stroop task was intermixed with
a Flanker (Experiment 1) or a Simon
(Experiment 2) task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict tasks
Kan et al., 2013 Color Stroop and sentence
processing or perceptual
ambiguity
Stroop trials were intermixed with a
sentence processing task in a first
experiment, and with a perceptual
ambiguity task in a second experiment
Global. CSE was observed from the
sentence processing task, as well as the
perceptual ambiguity task, to the Stroop
task
Kleiman et al., 2014 Flanker task and a gender
flanker task or race priming
task
The influence of flanker congruency on
stereotypical biases was investigated
combining a letter flanker task with a
gender flanker task (Experiment 1) or race
sequential priming task (Experiment 2)
Global. Stereotypical biases were
observed following flanker congruent
trials, indicated by a CSE from the flanker
task to both the gender flanker task, and
the race priming task
Kim et al., 2012 Color Stroop and arrow
Stroop
A factorial combination of a color and
arrow Stroop task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict type
Kunde and Stöcker, 2002 Spatial and temporal Simon A factorial combination of a temporal and
spatial Simon task
Specific. CSE was not observed across
conflict type, but, importantly, also not
within-conflict type for the temporal
Simon task
Kunde and Wühr, 2006,
Experiment 2
Simon and prime-target A factorial combination of a Simon and a
spatial prime-target task
Global and specific. CSE was observed
across conflict tasks, but was smaller
across than within conflict type
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Authors Conflict tasks Method Findings: specific or global?
CONFLICT TYPE
Kunde et al., 2012 Simon and affective
interference
A factorial combination of an affective
interference and a Simon task was used
where the interference was either of a
different type (Experiment 1) or the same
type (Experiment 2)
Specific. CSE was observed within the
conflict types but not across the conflict
types in both experiments
Rünger et al., 2010 Flanker and number Stroop Performance on a number Stroop task
was investigated as a function of
previously (cued) flanker congruency
Specific. CSE was not observed across
tasks. This study was set up as a
replication study and reported as a
replication failure of Fernandez-Duque and
Knight (2008)’s Experiment 4
Schlaghecken et al., 2011 Simon and prime-target A factorial combination of a Simon and a
spatial prime-target task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict type
Verbruggen et al., 2005 Spatial Stroop and Simon A Simon task was intermixed with a
Spatial Stroop task
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict type
Wendt et al., 2006 Simon and flanker or Stroop A factorial combination of a Simon and a
flanker task (Experiment 2A) or a Simon
and a Stroop task (Experiment 2B) was
used
Specific. CSE was observed within, but
not across conflict type
Wühr et al., 2014 Simon and Stroop A manual Simon and verbal Stroop task
(Experiment 3) were intermixed
Specific CSE was observed within, but not
across conflict type
CONFLICT DIMENSIONS
Cho et al., 2009 Stimulus response
compatibility task
A stimulus-response compatibility task
was used where each trial was preceded
by a cue denoting an either compatible or
incompatible response mapping along a
horizontal or vertical dimension
Global. In four experiments, a CSE was
observed across dimensions
Freitas et al., 2007,
Experiment 1
Flanker An arrow flanker task was administered
that was oriented on either a horizontal or
vertical dimension
Global. CSE was observed across
dimensions
Freitas and Clark, 2014,
Experiment 1
Stroop-trajectory A newly developed Stroop trajectory task
was oriented on either a vertical or
horizontal dimension
Global. CSE was observed across
dimensions
Funes et al., 2010b,
Experiments 3 and 4
Spatial Stroop A Spatial stroop task was varied on
horizontal or vertical dimensions with the
same (Experiment 3) or a different
stimulus set (Experiment 4)
Global. CSE was observed across
dimensions in both experiments
Kunde and Wühr, 2006,
Experiment 1
Prime-target An arrow prime-target task was presented
on either a horizontal or vertical dimension
Global. CSE was observed across
dimensions
Lee and Cho, 2013,
Experiments 1A, 1B, and 4
Simon and Spatial Stroop The relevant information and conflict type
was the same, but the dimension (vertical
vs. horizontal) varied in a Simon
(Experiment 1A) and Spatial Stroop task
(Experiment 1B)
Specific. CSE only when the previous and
current dimension was the same, even
when both dimensions of the Simon task
where mapped to the same response
(Experiment 4)
Mayr et al., 2003 Flanker An arrow flanker task was used with
either horizontal or vertical arrows
Specific. CSE only when the previous and
current dimension was the same
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Authors Conflict tasks Method Findings: specific or global?
CONFLICT DIMENSIONS
Schmidt and Weissman, 2014 Prime-target The relevant information and conflict type
was the same, but the dimension (vertical
vs. horizontal) varied in an arrow
prime-target (Experiment 1) and word
prime-target (Experiment 2) task
Global. CSE was observed across
dimensions in both experiments
Wühr et al., 2014 Simon A vertical and horizontal Simon task with
shared relevant dimension (color;
Experiment 1) or different relevant
dimension (shape and color; Experiment 2)
were intermixed (Experiment 1)
Global and Specific CSE was always
observed within dimensions, yet only
across dimensions when both tasks
shared the relevant dimension
TASK STRUCTURE, RESPONSE SETS, AND CONTEXT
Akçay and Hazeltine, 2008 Simon Two separate response sets were
assigned to either shared or segregated
stimuli sets in Experiment 1, 2, and 4, and
two segregated stimuli sets were
assigned to one response set in
Experiment 3
Global and Specific. CSE was observed
within, but not across segregated stimuli
sets assigned to two separate response
sets. CES was observed across task sets
when either stimuli sets or response sets
overlapped
Braem et al., 2011 Simon Stimulus color determined distinctive
response sets (hands and feet) vs. similar
response sets (combination of hand
responses)
Specific. CSE across response sets when
similar, but not when distinctive
Braem et al., 2014 Flanker A flanker task was presented in the
context of a visual search experiment
where task-irrelevant color could interfere
with visual search
Specific. CSE was only observed when
previous and current task-irrelevant color
surrounding the flanker stimulus was the
same
Fischer et al., 2010 Simon Single and double-task contexts were
mixed
Specific. CSE did not depend on task load,
but was only observed within and not
across task contexts
Hazeltine et al., 2011,
Experiment 2 vs. 3
Prime-target Two stimuli sets were assigned to one vs.
two hands
Specific. CSE when assigned to the same,
but not when assigned to different
response set
Hazeltine et al., 2011,
Experiments 1 and 4
Prime-target One (letters) vs. two (letters and animals)
sets of stimuli were used in experiment 1
vs. 4, and stimuli were presented in either
visual or auditory modality
Global and Specific. CSE only when the
preceding and the current stimulus were
of the same modality. However, CSE was
observed across modalities when two
stimuli sets were used
Kiesel et al., 2006 Parity/Magnitude Task A parity task (press left when odd, right
when even) was intermixed with a
magnitude task (press left when smaller,
right when bigger than five) and conflict
originated from incompatible mappings
Specific. CSE only when tasks repeated,
not when tasks alternated
Kim and Cho, 2014 Flanker One stimulus set was assigned to four
fingers of one hand vs. two times two
fingers of both hands
Specific. CSE across fingers when
assigned to one hand, but not when
assigned to two hands
Lee and Cho, 2013, Experiment
2 vs. 3
Simon and Spatial Stroop The two conflict tasks were assigned to
the same, or different hands
Specific. CSE across conflict types was
observed when the same, but not when a
different, response set was used for both
tasks
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Authors Conflict tasks Method Findings: specific or global?
TASK STRUCTURE, RESPONSE SETS, AND CONTEXT
Notebaert and Verguts, 2008 Simon and SNARC Stimulus color was the relevant dimension
in both tasks, or only in one task (and
orientation in the other)
Global and Specific. CSE was observed
across conflict type, but only when task
relevant information was the same
Spapé and Hommel, 2008 Color Stroop Voice gender, irrelevant to the task, was
manipulated in an auditory Stroop task
Specific. CSE only when previous and
current voice gender were the same
Several studies followed in the wake of these first seminal
observations. Many used similar factorial combinations of two
conflict types where each trial could be subject to two types of
compatibility effects. For example, Schlaghecken et al. (2011)
used a similar design as Kunde and Wühr (2006), but with a cen-
trally, rather than laterally, presented prime. In contrast to Kunde
and Wühr, Schlaghecken and colleagues observed no CSE across
conflict types. Additionally, instead of using a Simon task as a sec-
ondary task as in Wendt et al. (2006), Boy et al. (2010) used a
factorial combination of a prime-target task and a flanker task.
These authors, too, observed a CSE within, but not across con-
flict types. Akçay and Hazeltine (2011) followed up more directly
on Wendt et al. (2006) by using a similar design where they fac-
torially crossed Simon and flanker conflict whilst controlling for
feature repetition effects. Like in the study by Wendt et al. (2006),
a CSE was observed within, but not across conflict type (see also
Egner et al., 2007). Kim et al. (2012) also found conflict type spe-
cific CSEs when using a factorial combination of an arrow and
color Stroop task. Last, Kunde et al. (2012) extended this research
into the affective domain, by factorially combining a Simon task
and an affective interference task. The affective interference task
either consisted of a conflict between the relevant and irrelevant
stimulus dimension (i.e., affective pictures and affective words,
Experiment 1), or a conflict between the relevant response and
irrelevant stimulus dimension (i.e., affective verbal responses and
smiley faces, Experiment 2). In both experiments Kunde et al.
(2012) only observed a CSE within, but not across, conflict types.
Another set of studies explored the transfer of the CSE across
conflict types in paradigms where congruency conditions were
not factorially crossed within trials, but rather varied across tri-
als (i.e., stimulus- and task-switching designs). First efforts along
this line involve a study by Verbruggen et al. (2005), where spatial
Stroop trials were intermixed with Simon trials and only CSEs
within, but not across, conflict types were observed. Funes et al.
replicated this pattern twice with a similar combination between
a Simon and spatial Stroop task (Funes et al., 2010a,b), as well
as with a spatial Stroop and flanker task (Funes et al., 2010b).
Recently, Wühr et al.(2014; Experiment 3) similarly found no evi-
dence for a transfer of the CSE from a manual Simon task to a
verbal Stroop task. Last, intermixing Simon and color Stroop tri-
als, Forster and Cho (2014) again demonstrated how CSEs could
only be observed within, but not across conflict types.
However, some of these studies did report a CSE across con-
flict type. Specifically, it has been observed between a Simon and
SNARC task (Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes;
Notebaert and Verguts, 2008), between a number Stroop task and
a flanker task or color Stroop task (Fernandez-Duque and Knight,
2008), between vocal flanker and color Stroop task (Freitas et al.,
2007; Experiment 2), between joy-stick-based Flanker and spatial
Stroop task (Freitas et al., 2007; Experiment 3), and between two
different spatial Stroop tasks and an arrow flanker task (Freitas
and Clark, 2014). With respect to the study of Fernandez-Duque
and Knight (2008), the congruency identity of the previous trial
was always cued which renders the design susceptible to more
proactive control processes. Also, it must be noted that Rünger
et al. (2010) attempted and failed to replicate the results of
Fernandez-Duque and Knight (2008). Therefore, the generaliz-
ability of this experiment remains to be tested. Moreover, Freitas
and Clark (2014) also used a design intermixing a newly devel-
oped Stroop trajectory task (to circumvent feature integration
and contingency learning confounds) with a factorial combina-
tion of a flanker and Simon task (Experiment 3). Notably, while a
CSE was observed between the Stroop trajectory task and flanker
task, no transfer of the CSE was observed between the Stroop
trajectory and Simon task (CSEs between flanker and Simon
congruencies were not analyzed).
Finally, two recent studies by Kan et al. (2013) and Kleiman
et al. (2014) used a slightly different approach by combining dis-
tinctively different tasks with a Stroop or flanker task. Specifically,
a recent study by Kan et al. (2013) showed CSEs across tasks by
demonstrating how difficult sentence processing experienced in a
sentence reading task, or perceptual ambiguity experienced in a
perceptual detection task, can decrease the Stroop effect on a sub-
sequent trial. Similarly, Kleiman et al. (2014) demonstrated how
flanker congruency on a previous trial can modulate stereotypi-
cal biases measured on the current trial. Specifically, stereotypical
biases, measured using a gender flanker task (Experiment 1) or
race prime-target task (Experiment 2), were only observed follow-
ing congruent flanker trials, but abolished following incongruent
flanker trials.
Taken together, the studies employing factorial combinations
of conflict type generally demonstrate that CSEs are conflict type
specific, except for the study by Kunde and Wühr (2006), where
a CSE between prime-target and Simon effect was still observed
(albeit reliably smaller than was the case for within conflict type).
On the other hand, studies that investigated the transfer of CSEs
across conflict types by using designs where separate trials belong
to either one or the other conflict type, have resulted in a more
equivocal set of findings.
THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT ACROSS SPATIAL DIMENSIONS
A small but substantial number of experiments has been devoted
to the detection of CSEs across dimensions but within conflict
types. These studies were restricted to spatial congruency effects,
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where conflict on each trial is induced on either a horizontal or
vertical dimension. A first study to investigate this was the study
byMayr et al. (2003), in which an arrow flanker CSE was observed
within but not across spatial dimensions. Freitas et al. (2007),
however, reported on a reliable CSE across dimensions in a similar
setting (Experiment 1), which, they argued, could be due to their
shorter stimulus presentation time. Similarly, Kunde and Wühr
(2006, Experiment 1) later on demonstrated how the CSE can
also be observed across spatial dimensions when administering an
arrow prime-target task. Comparable studies followed and CSEs
across vertical and horizontal dimensions have been observed in
spatial Stroop tasks (Funes et al., 2010b, Experiments 3 and 4),
stimulus-response compatibility tasks (Cho et al., 2009), arrow
and word prime-target tasks (Schmidt and Weissman, 2014), a
Stroop trajectory task (Freitas and Clark, 2014), and the Simon
task (Braem et al., 2011; Wühr et al., 2014, Experiment 1). Finally,
in addition to Mayr et al. (2003), one more study has failed to
observe such CSEs. Specifically, Lee and Cho (2013, Experiments
1A and 1B) did not observe a congruence sequence effect across
dimensions when varying dimensions in a Simon (Experiments
1A) or spatial Stroop task (Experiments 2B). Overall, then, with
two exceptions (Mayr et al., 2003; Lee and Cho, 2013) it has
been consistently demonstrated that CSEs can be observed across
vertical and horizontal dimensions within conflict type.
THE IMPACT OF TASK SETS ON THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT
A third group of studies manipulated specific task parameters to
investigate the determinants of CSEs across task sets. According
to the definition offered by Schneider and Logan (2014), task
sets can be understood as “a set of representations and processes
capable of performing a task, including the parameterization
of those processes and the identification of their neural sub-
strates” (Schneider and Logan, 2014, p. 29). Importantly, and
in strong contrast to some of the work described above, these
studies mostly kept conflict type constant, but were interested in
whether or not stimulus sets or response sets might co-determine
the scope of conflict adaptation. For example, Kiesel et al. (2006)
used a parity/magnitude task-switching study in which congru-
ency conditions were created by partially (in)compatible response
mappings between both tasks. Using this task, Kiesel et al. (2006)
were the first to demonstrate how CSEs are task-specific and thus
observed on task repetitions only. Notably, the two tasks used
competing response mappings. For example, in the parity task
participants had to press left when the number was odd and right
when even, whereas in the magnitude task participants had to
press left when the number was smaller than five and right when
bigger than five. This way, congruent numbers (i.e., “1”) required
the same response on both tasks, whereas incongruent numbers
(e.g., “2”) did not.
Other studies used either the same, or not necessarily compet-
ing, response mappings to investigate the impact of task sets on
the specificity of conflict adaptation. In two closely matched con-
ditions, Notebaert and Verguts (2008) demonstrated how their
above-mentioned transfer of CSE between Simon and SNARC
tasks crucially depended on whether or not both tasks used the
same task-relevant information, as the transfer disappeared when
both tasks where assigned to different task-relevant information.
In a similar vein, Wühr et al. (2014) only showed transfer of the
CSE between vertical and horizontal Simon tasks when the rele-
vant dimension was identical between the two tasks (i.e., color),
but not when the relevant dimension varied across tasks (i.e.,
color and shape). Other studies focused on whether or not two
tasks use the same response set or not. Braem et al. (2011), for
example, demonstrated how a CSE could be observed between
a vertical and horizontal Simon task, but only when two highly
similar response sets were used (a complex combination requiring
both hands for both tasks), and not when both response sets dis-
tinctively differed (hand vs. feet). Kim and Cho (2014) observed
a similar dependence on response sets in a four-color flanker task
where two out of four colors were only presented on odd trials,
and the other two on even trials. Specifically, when assigning the
four horizontally aligned color buttons to four fingers from one
hand, a CSE was observed across colors. However, when the two
leftmost buttons were assigned to the left hand (odd trials), and
the rightmost buttons to the right hand (even trials), no CSE was
observed. In a similar vein, Lee and Cho (2013) showed how a
CSE between a spatial Stroop and Simon task could be obtained,
but only when the tasks were assigned to the same response hand
(Experiments 2 vs. 3). Again using a Simon task, Akçay and
Hazeltine (2008) likewise demonstrated how the CSE could not
be observed when two segregated stimuli sets were assigned to
two separate response sets. However, whenever either the stimuli
sets or the response sets overlapped, a CSE across conditions was
found. In a similar vein, using a prime-target paradigm, Hazeltine
et al. (2011) demonstrated how two stimuli sets assigned to either
one or two hands only showed an across-set CSE when both sets
were assigned to one hand (Experiments 2 vs. 3). Overall, these
studies indicate that the partitioning of particular stimuli and
response sets within a certain task can be a sufficient condition
to observe set-specific CSEs.
CONTEXTUAL TASK-IRRELEVANT FACTORS AND THE CONGRUENCY
SEQUENCE EFFECT
A final set of studies investigated the CSE as a function of task-
irrelevant contextual factors. Most notably, Spapé and Hommel
(2008) demonstrated how the Stroop CSE is sensitive to voice
gender in an auditory Stroop task. In their Stroop task, color
detection could be facilitated or hampered by the auditory pre-
sentation of congruent or incongruent words spoken by male
or female voices. Interestingly, CSEs were only observed when
voice gender repeated, but not when voice gender alternated. In
a similar vein, Hazeltine et al. (2011) demonstrated how the CSE
depended on whether or not the previous and current stimuli
were of the same modality (visual or auditory, Experiment 1).
However, when increasing stimulus set heterogeneity by introduc-
ing a second different category of stimuli, thismodality-specificity
of the CSE disappeared (Experiment 4). Investigating the impact
of task load on the CSE, Fischer et al. (2010) observed how
the CSE was dependent on whether both the current and pre-
vious trial were presented in both dual task or single task con-
ditions, but not when alternating between them. The authors
concluded that task context, rather than task load, is a crucial
determinant in bringing about the CSE. Last, Braem et al. (2014)
recently observed how a flanker CSE depends on whether or not
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a surrounding shape is presented in the same, or rather in an
alternative color as the previous trial. By pairing a visual search
task with a flanker task (i.e., participants had to search a unique
shape out of six shapes and respond to the flanker task pre-
sented within that shape), these authors demonstrated that only
under conditions where task-irrelevant shape color repeated, a
congruence sequence effect occurred. Together, these experiments
all seem to suggest that the repetition or alternation of task-
irrelevant contextual salient features can codetermine whether or
not a CSE will occur.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
On the basis of our review we can identify two important fac-
tors determining the specificity of conflict adaptation: conflict
type and context-similarity. When it comes to conflict type, we
agree with Egner’s (2008) review that in full-factorial designs
there is abundant evidence that the CSE appears to be con-
flict type-specific (Egner, 2008). Only Kunde and Wühr (2006)
observed a reliable, albeit smaller, CSE across congruency condi-
tions, which, according to Egner (2008), was most likely due to
the high similarity between the two conflict types. Consistently,
when Schlaghecken et al. (2011) attempted to replicate Kunde
andWühr (2006) with a centrally (rather than laterally) presented
prime, they did not observe a CSE across conflict types.
A second line of research used non-factorial designs. Note
that Egner (2008) argued against using such designs because they
are often confounded with switch costs and do not allow the
researcher to investigate if both conflict types are independent
(additive) or not. Importantly, Egner (2008) was only interested
in the conflict-specificity of the CSE, whereas we, in our review,
are interested in the scope of conflict adaptation more generally
(across various conditions). Therefore, we consider switch costs
a second, informative symptom of the same phenomenon that
might explain the absence of a transfer of the CSE across con-
ditions: participants represented both conflict types as deriving
from two different task sets (see below). For this reason, we will
also discuss these studies, but treat them separately as studies
indexing the impact of task sets or context, rather than con-
flict type. Although some of these studies’ main intention was
to investigate the conflict-specificity, the impact of conflict type
cannot be disentangled from task set or task context. Therefore,
these studies do not allow to make more specific inferences about
conflict-specificity (Egner, 2008).
Interestingly, despite the fact that most studies using non-
factorial designs found task-specific CSEs, some found across task
CSEs. Most of these across-task—and thus relatively domain-
general—CSE observations can be ascribed to using either sim-
ilar conflict types (e.g., Fernandez-Duque and Knight, 2008;
Notebaert and Verguts, 2008; Freitas and Clark, 2014) and/or very
similar response mappings (e.g., Freitas et al., 2007; Notebaert
and Verguts, 2008). Indeed, when using different conflict types
(Freitas and Clark, 2014), or different response mappings
(Notebaert and Verguts, 2008), some of these studies reported
task-specific CSEs as well. Additionally, Rünger et al. (2010)
attempted and failed to replicate the results of Fernandez-Duque
and Knight (2008) so there might be need for further replica-
tion studies (see suggestions for replication endeavors below).
However, it is not our aim to refute these domain-general CSE
observations as methodologically flawed. In fact, such observa-
tions might sometimes be obscured by the lack of statistical power
to observe more subtle across-domain CSEs. Moreover, as we will
argue below, these observations might be expected in cases where
both task sets are not interfering with each other.
In contrast to the full-factorial designs described above, we
cannot conclude on whether or not these studies evidence the
conflict specificity of the CSE. However, at the very least these
studies do suggest that task structure can determine the speci-
ficity of CSE. This idea that task sets might play an important
role in determining the scope of the CSE is not new. Indeed, as
reviewed above, Hazeltine and colleagues (Akçay and Hazeltine,
2008; Hazeltine et al., 2011) clearly stressed the role of task sets
and task boundaries in bringing about CSEs. Recent evidence
seems to support this hypothesis. An increasing number of papers
have demonstrated this importance of stimulus and response sets
by demonstrating how CSEs across task sets do not occur when
both sets are clearly distinguishable and thus perceived as differ-
ent task sets, especially when both sets have conflicting response
mappings. Interestingly, this does not necessarily depend on the
complexity of the task, which naturally increases with using mul-
tiple stimuli sets. In fact, Hazeltine and colleagues demonstrated
how increasing stimulus set size and modality to the extent that it
is not longer beneficial to dissociate the different sets, allows for
across-modality and across-set CSEs to occur (Hazeltine et al.,
2011, Experiment 4). We believe this role of task sets remains
an under-investigated aspect of conflict adaptation, and we will
offer some suggestions below as to how the implementation and
impact of such instructed task sets can be further investigated.
The adaptation-by-binding theory offers a computational
implementation of conflict adaptation. It states that upon con-
flict detection, a general Hebbian learning signal (“now print”) is
sent throughout the brain to strengthen all active ongoing asso-
ciations. Task set representations are activated by task demand
units which can, just like simple stimulus or response units, be
strengthened following conflict detection. Therefore, this theory
can account for the susceptibility of CSEs to task set boundaries.
However, it actually goes one step further and predicts that also
task-irrelevant features can influence the scope of conflict adap-
tation. In fact, everything that is salient and/or systematically
co-activated can be picked up by this Hebbian learning mecha-
nism and incorporated in the strengthening of associations. This
way, we can expect that if a salient event occurs in the tempo-
ral vicinity of conflict detection, task associations might become
temporarily associated with this stimulus feature or event and
CSEs can therefore be specific to the repetition of this event.
Indeed, as reviewed above, a number of studies have observed
such context-specific CSEs. In some of these studies, this effect
was not anticipated (e.g., Fischer et al., 2010), so there is clear
room for further systematic investigations on the impact of such
contextual features.
PROPOSED SYNTHESIS
Taken together, these stimulus-, task-, or context-switching
designs might be integrated by the general principle that con-
flict adaptation is highly specific to the context—where we should
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understand context in its broadest sense to cover the impact of
both (instructed) task-relevant features (including, for example,
S-R mappings) as well as task-irrelevant (but salient) features.
However, how then should we understand the few studies that
seem to refute context-specificity, such as those of Kan et al.
(2013) and Kleiman et al. (2014) which demonstrated that CSEs
can be observed across very different task sets? Therefore, we pro-
pose the working hypothesis that transfer of CSEs can be observed
across contextual features (both task-relevant and -irrelevant) as
long as these features are simultaneously and actively maintained
(in working memory). Studies in which two contexts are used
that would substantially interfere with each other when they are
both actively maintained, will result in strategies where only one
context is active at any time such that transfer is prevented. This
fits nicely with interference based models of working memory
as developed by Oberauer and colleagues (Oberauer and Kliegl,
2006; Oberauer et al., 2012) where working memory capacity
restrictions arise from interference, rather than, for example, lim-
ited resources. Similarly, Oberauer et al. (2012) model suggests
that interference in working memory will be greater when (task)
features overlap or belong to similar categories. Therefore, two
contexts that are sufficiently different such that simultaneous
maintenance is possible without much interference (cf. Kan et al.,
2013; Kleiman et al., 2014), may result in transfer across (very
different) contexts. Hence, whereas one would predict a linear
relation between context similarity and the chance of observing
transfer of the CSE from the idea that task sets determine the
scope of conflict adaptation (Hazeltine et al., 2011), we predict a
U-shaped relationship (see Figure 1): transfer is observed when-
ever two contexts (task-relevant and -irrelevant) are either very
similar or sufficiently dissimilar to prevent interference.
Importantly, this idea is not entirely new. Hazeltine and col-
leagues made a similar observation when discussing the find-
ings of Freitas et al. (2007) who did observe a CSE across task
sets. Specifically, they argued that because Freitas and colleagues
increased the heterogeneity within their tasks, and switched
the tasks randomly, the salience of the task boundaries was
FIGURE 1 | Abstract depiction of the hypothesized u-shaped relation
between context (dis)similarity and congruency sequence effects
across contexts. As per example, three different empirical studies are
displayed along the function.
reduced, allowing CSEs to occur across task sets (Hazeltine
et al., 2011). This fits with our proposal that interfering contexts
or interfering tasks rather than context or task similarity are
the key factor in determining the scope of conflict adaptation.
Interestingly, this might also explain why factorial combina-
tion studies mostly observe conflict-specific CSEs while similar
investigations using stimulus-switching designs have sometimes
observed across-conflict CSEs. Whereas the former closely inter-
mix different congruency conditions, the latter dissociate both
congruency conditions to the extent that they can again either
be perceived as one task set, especially when they share task-
relevant information (Notebaert and Verguts, 2008), or as two
non-interfering task sets, that can easily be maintained in parallel
in working memory.
This idea is also compatible with the computational model of
Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009). In their adaptation by bind-
ing theory, Verguts and Notebaert propose that following conflict
detection, a general Hebbian learning signal is sent through-
out the brain that reinforces all active and ongoing associations.
Importantly, although the model is blind to what is task-relevant
or not, task-relevant associations are mostly the ones that are
strengthened since these are the most active during conflict-
resolution. Whenever tasks are defined on the basis of features
(e.g., S-R mappings) that are mutually interfering, the result may
be that at each moment in time (i.e., each trial) only one of the
two tasks can be actively maintained—and thus that binding pro-
cesses underlying adaptation are specific to one but not the other
task (no “transfer” between tasks). Now, in such designs where
interfering associations (e.g., from interfering task sets) have to
be suppressed to ensure successful conflict resolution, we can pre-
dict that these task sets will not benefit from this Hebbian learning
signal, and domain-specific CSEs will be observed (halfway the U-
shaped function on Figure 1). However, when both task sets are
very compatible either because they are highly similar (left hand
side of the U-shaped distribution on Figure 1), or because they
are highly distinctive and can be simultaneously kept available in
working memory (right hand side of the U-shaped distribution
on Figure 1), domain-general CSEs might occur.
Lastly, we would like to add that memory-based theories
(Hommel et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2013) should not—as is currently
the case—be seen as theoretical alternatives to conflict adapta-
tion theories (for similar arguments, see Spapé and Hommel,
2008; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008; Braem et al., 2011; Hazeltine
et al., 2011; Jimenez and Méndez, 2014). In fact, these theo-
ries and their predictions concerning the specificity of CSEs are
largely compatible to the above-made predictions and observa-
tions. For example, using their theory of event codes, Hommel
et al. (2004) proposed that the CSE can be understood in terms of
slower partial repetitions vs. faster complete repetitions or alter-
nations of event files (see above). This view can easily be extended
to task sets or contexts. CSEs without feature repetitions have
now been demonstrated (e.g., Duthoo and Notebaert, 2012), but
it is still possible that (latent) partial repetitions of certain task
sets can prevent CSEs from occurring across task sets. In fact,
this idea is compatible with our proposed U-shaped function
between task-similarity and CSEs across tasks: complete repeti-
tions (of largely overlapping task sets) or complete alternations
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(of distinctively different task sets) can allow for across-task CSEs
to occur, while partial repetitions (task sets partially sharing fea-
tures or resources) are more demanding for working memory and
therefore induce task-specific CSEs. Interestingly, these learning
theories motivate us to further pursue the research question how
exactly task structures are implemented, remembered, and dealt
with, while simultaneously investigating the impact of contex-
tual features and associative learning. However, although learning
theories as such, we believe, offer important theoretical insights,
and need to be taken into account when considering modula-
tions of cognitive control, they do need to be controlled for when
using the CSE as a metric of conflict adaptation. For example,
while the theory of event coding (Hommel, 2004; Hommel et al.,
2004) is consistent with our proposedU-shaped function between
context-similarity and CSEs across contexts, it does not account
for observations showing CSEs devoid of feature integration, as it
does not acknowledge a role for congruency identity of the previ-
ous trial as an important determinant for the CSE. Importantly,
such CSEs devoid of feature integration and contingency learn-
ing have been demonstrated (for a comprehensive review in this
same issue, see Duthoo et al., 2014), but only recently. As a result,
only a small number of the above-mentioned studies controlled
for both feature integration and contingency learning (Freitas and
Clark, 2014; Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt and Weissman, 2014).
These paradigms should be taken as guides for further research on
the specificity (and other modulations) of conflict adaptation. In
fact, such experiments are much needed as it is currently unclear
to which extent earlier studies on the CSE (and their modula-
tions) could have been attributed to their confound with feature
integration or contingency learning.
CONCLUSIONS, CHALLENGES, AND GUIDELINES
In sum, we reviewed the most prominent theories, and, to our
knowledge, all studies that investigated the specificity of conflict
adaptation. We identified a number of elements that can deter-
mine the scope of conflict adaptation. In fact, in line with the
reviewed theories, conflict type (Egner, 2008), task set (Hazeltine
et al., 2011), and context (Verguts and Notebaert, 2009), all seem
to play a central role in determining whether or not across-
condition CSEs will occur. In contrast, conflict dimension (ver-
tical vs. horizontal) did not appear to be a crucial factor (but see
Mayr et al., 2003; Lee and Cho, 2013). To account for the current
set of data, we proposed a U-shaped function between context
similarity and cross-condition conflict adaptation. Therein, we
stress the role of task sets and whether or not they can be simul-
taneously activated in working memory. We believe there are still
a number of challenges ahead, opening up new opportunities for
further research. Therefore, we will end by identifying some of
those challenges and offer a number of tentative guidelines on
how one might tackle them.
First, we illustrated how the current state of the art in con-
flict adaptation research and its specificity can be understood in
terms of a U-shaped relation between transfer of the CSE and
context similarity. Importantly, whenever both task sets can be
simultaneously updated because they are either highly similar
or distinctively different and non-interfering, adaptation across
tasks and conditions can be observed. We believe this hypothesis
is testable or falsifiable by using a design where task sets or condi-
tions are parametrically dissociated. However, in setting up such a
design it will be important to develop a paradigm where the task-
rules are not overly complicated (participants should still be able
to keep both tasks in working memory).
Second, we re-emphasize the importance of taking into
account task sets when investigating the specificity of conflict
adaptation (Hazeltine et al., 2011). In this respect, a promising
new research field on task instructions has developed a number of
interesting paradigms that allow us to test the effects of task sets
whilst controlling for the repetition or alternation of more low-
level stimulus or response feature characteristics. For example,
Dreisbach et al. (2007) elegantly demonstrated how it is possible
to introduce a difference in task sets by mere instructions, with-
out having to manipulate stimulus features or stimulus-response
mappings. Specifically, in their study, Dreisbach et al. (2007; see
also Dreisbach and Haider, 2008, 2009) trained participants at
certain stimulus-response (S-R) rules between eight stimuli and
two responses after which they could either receive, or not receive,
an overarching rule that is able to categorize the same S-R rules as
belonging to one out of two task sets. Interestingly, while both
groups performed sufficiently well at the S-R rules, performance
in the late-informed task set group was worsened, relative to
the uninformed group, as evidenced by task-switch costs follow-
ing task-rule instructions. Clearly, this implementation of task
sets introduced new task boundaries that interfered with switch-
ing between the two groups of stimuli. Importantly, paradigms
like these can allow us to investigate the impact of task sets on
conflict adaptation, without having to create different stimuli.
Moreover, these studies allow us to investigate how exactly task
sets are implemented as this remains an under-investigated issue
in the cognitive control literature (see also Everaert et al., 2014;
Liefooghe et al., 2012).
Third, we discussed a number of recent studies that demon-
strated the impact of salient task-irrelevant uninstructed features
on the specificity of conflict adaptation. However, these studies
are still relatively scarce, and a systematic investigation of these
effects seems warranted. Moreover, whereas theories predicting
these effects (Verguts and Notebaert, 2008) seem to emphasize
these kind of bottom-up effects, others have emphasized top-
down effects (Hazeltine et al., 2011). We have stressed the impor-
tance of both instructed task sets as well as the impact of these
contextual features. Therefore, an interesting challenge remains
the investigation of how the impact of task-irrelevant unin-
structed features might still differ from the impact of instructed
task sets on conflict adaptation, as well as how they interact. We
argued that both can co-determine the scope of conflict adapta-
tion. However, future research should offer a more nuanced view
by unraveling the complex interplay between the effects of (top-
down) task sets vs. (bottom-up) context on conflict adaptation.
Lastly, researchers should engage in trying to test the impact
of specificity with paradigms that are free of feature integration
or contingency learning confounds (Freitas and Clark, 2014; Kim
and Cho, 2014; Schmidt and Weissman, 2014; Weissman et al.,
2014). This is non-trivial, as most measures of the CSE thus far
can be alternatively explained by low-level memory effects. In
another review article in this same issue, we outline the specific
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problems that one needs to take into account, and outline a num-
ber of guidelines on how researchers can develop the appropriate
paradigms (Duthoo et al., 2014). However, this need for dissoci-
ating learning effects from CSEs is purely methodological, and
should not be mistaken for a motivation to theoretically dis-
tance those from conflict adaptation research. In fact, here, as
well as in earlier works (Spapé and Hommel, 2008; Verguts and
Notebaert, 2008; Braem et al., 2011; Hazeltine et al., 2011; Jimenez
and Méndez, 2014), it has been argued that memory effects and
associative learning can offer important insights in the underlying
mechanisms and dynamics of conflict adaptation.
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